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BY GEOFFREY C. HAZARD JR. 
Developing 
CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 
FOR EUROPEAN COURTS
A REPORT ON THE ELI CIVIL PROCEDURE PROJECT
is the European Law Institute. 
Its Secretariat is based in 
Vienna, Austria; its members 
include judges, lawyers, law professors, 
ministry of justice officials, and law firms 
from the European Community. It is 
substantially modeled on the American 
Law Institute, but its wider range of 
membership, particularly government 
lawyers ex officio, means that ELI has some-
thing of a quasi-governmental standing. 
ELI is currently engaged in a number of 
interesting law reform projects in such 
areas as consumer protection law, insol-
vency law, and contract law. The aim is 
to formulate laws and codes that could be 
adopted in member states, thus contribut-
ing to the harmonization of law among the 
European countries.
ELI
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Among ELI’s projects is developing a 
set of rules, or code, of civil procedure. The 
project has been underway for about three 
years and has made substantial progress. At 
this stage, its conclusions are only tentative 
and its specific provisions will be reconsid-
ered in light of the whole set. 
Among the important issues are — no 
surprise to U.S. law people — jurisdiction 
over foreign parties, notice requirements, 
pleading, and joinder of claims. Most sensi-
tive — again no surprise — is the question 
of pretrial discovery, including depositions 
and production of documents. Indeed, the 
subject is so sensitive that in the ELI proj-
ect the process is called “access to evidence” 
rather than “discovery.” (The matter of 
discovery/access is further discussed below.)
THE TRANSNATIONAL RULES
The ELI Civil Procedure project has 
had a head start by reason of an earlier 
project, the Principles of Transnational 
Procedure and accompanying rules. 
See ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure 
(Cambridge U. Press, 2006). The Principles 
and Rules have been taken by ELI as the 
framework for its project. 
The Transnational Rules project 
was cosponsored by the American 
Law Institute (ALI) and UNIDROIT. 
“UNIDROIT” is the French acronym 
for the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law. UNIDROIT 
was established in 1923 as a part of the 
League of Nations apparatus and has its 
headquarters in Rome. It has a long and 
positive provenance although a relatively 
modest record in model legislation.  
The Transnational Rules project 
began as an idea developed by Prof. 
Michele Taruffo, an Italian law profes-
sor specializing in comparative law, 
and myself, then winding down my 
term as ALI Director. Taruffo, whose 
background is in civil law, and I, with 
a background in common law, had 
done several studies together. This led 
us to believe that, contrary to conven-
tional legal opinion, the civil law and 
common-law systems could be inte-
grated. We spent a year working together 
to develop a skeletal version of such a 
system. Armed with resulting confidence, 
we obtained approval from ALI to propose a 
joint venture to UNIDROIT.
UNIDROIT engaged Prof. Rolf Sturner 
of Freiburg University in Germany to eval-
uate the proposal. Sturner’s career involved 
being a judge as well as a distinguished 
professor of law. Sturner had done import-
ant work in comparative procedure, includ-
ing a project with Peter Murray of Harvard 
comparing German civil procedure with its 
U.S. counterpart. Sturner made a positive 
evaluation of the proposed project and later 
joined the project team as a Co-Reporter. 
Also joining the team as Associate Reporter 
was Prof. Antonio Gidi, who was trained 
in Brazil’s civil-law system and teaches 
comparative law in the U.S. 
The Transnational Rules project had 
an ALI advisory committee that included 
judges, lawyers, and legal academics. 
The legal academics notably included 
Professors Mary Kay Kane of the University 
of California, Hastings, a coauthor of a 
leading treatise on U.S. federal procedure, 
and Edward Cooper of the University 
of Michigan, who was Reporter for the 
Civil Rules subcommittee of the Standing 
Committee on Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States. 
UNIDROIT appointed a parallel 
working group that included specialists 
from England, France, Argentina, and 
Japan. Notable among the members of 
the working group were Justice Aida 
Kemelmayer de Carlucci, an appellate 
judge in Argentina, Prof. Neil Andrews 
of Cambridge University in the U.K., and 
Prof. Frederique Ferrand of Jean Moulin 
University in Lyon, France. Ferrand is 
completely versed not only in French law 
but also in German civil procedure. 
The Transnational Rules project was not 
targeted at any particular audience, thereby 
to avoid people who thought the idea of 
integrating civil and common-law systems 
was a pipedream. The discussions in both 
ALI and UNIDROIT groups “proceeded 
without the elaborate introductions often 
typical in international deliberations. 
On the contrary, discussion was simple, 
direct, professional, and sympathetic.” 
ALI/UNIDROIT, supra, at p. xliv. During 
the drafting process, working texts were 
disseminated to various legal scholars, some 
of whom expressed the usual doubts. At the 
conclusion of the drafting stage, in both 
English and French, the project conducted 
roadshows around the world. Those attend-
ing these sessions included legal scholars, 
judges, and practitioners from about 
15 countries, including China, Russia, 
Brazil, and Australia.
The Transnational Rules project was 
completed in 2004. In the intervening 
years the Principles and Rules attracted 
attention primarily in academic circles 
and some in international arbitration. 
See Bibliography, in ALI/UNIDROIT, 
supra, at pp. 157 et seq. No national 
regime adopted them. However, the 
transnational formulations were widely 
available and had attracted no substantial 
negative attention. 
The transnational texts have proved 
very useful in the ELI project. Several 
members of the transnational team are 
now engaged in the ELI enterprise, 
including Professors Sturner, Andrews, 
and Ferrand.
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES
It is worth reviewing the differences 
and similarities between, on the one 
hand, the Transnational Rules and 
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the emergent ELI formulations, and, on 
the other hand, the counterpart rules of 
civil-law systems and the American model 
epitomized in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP). Notable differences are: 
jury trial, the roles of judges and lawyers, 
and the scope of appellate review.  
No European civil procedural system 
uses juries, although some of them have lay 
arbiters in labor court procedure. Although 
jury trial in civil cases originated in 
England, English courts over a century ago 
ceased using juries except in a very limited 
category of cases. The Transnational Rules 
proceed on the premise that they can work 
equally well under a jury system. Rule 23.2 
of the Transnational Rules requires:
The judgment should be accompanied 
by a reasoned explanation of the essen-
tial factual, legal, and evidentiary basis 
of the decision. 
The accompanying comment states that 
compliance with this rule can be achieved 
by reference to “the transcript of the 
instructions to the jury.”
REGARDING THE ROLE OF JUDGES 
AND LAWYERS, a distinction is 
traditionally drawn between “inquisito-
rial” civil-law systems and “adversarial” 
common-law systems. This distinction 
is becoming more formal than actual. 
In England, the judges now have very 
substantial authority to manage civil 
cases, particularly in complex litigation. 
The same is true in the U.S. federal 
system, as expressed in FRCP 16 (pretrial 
conferences) and FRCP 26 (discovery). 
Many state systems have similar rules and 
some also have specialized courts with 
“managerial judges” to handle commer-
cial litigation.
The Transnational Rules address the 
roles of both judges and lawyers. Rule 10.1 
provides:
A judge . . . must not participate if 
there are reasonable grounds to doubt 
[his/her] impartiality.
Rules 10.2 and 10.3 go on to provide 
that “A party must have the right to make 
reasonable challenge of the impartiality of 
a judge” and that such a challenge must be 
heard by or appealable to a different judge. 
 Principles 4.1 and 4.2 provide that “a 
party [be able] to engage a lawyer of the 
party’s choice” and that “a lawyer’s profes-
sional independence should be respected.” 
The comment to these provisions states 
that “lawyers are expected to advocate 
the interests of their clients and gener-
ally to maintain the secrecy of confidences 
obtained in the course of representation.”
Rule 27.1 provides that “evidence may 
not be elicited in violation of the legal- 
profession privilege of confidentiality under 
forum law [or] confidentiality of communi-
cations in settlement negotiations.” 
REGARDING THE SCOPE OF APPEL-
LATE REVIEW, the difference remains 
at least formally significant. In the civil 
systems an appellate court has plenary 
authority to review an inferior court’s 
judgment, not only as to issues of law but 
also as to issues of fact. The underlying 
theory is that the civil code determines 
the substantive basis of the case and 
that the higher court judges have more 
authoritative understanding of the code’s 
provisions. The underlying civil-law 
theory regarding issues of fact tradi-
tionally has been that evidence is a legal 
science and that the strength of an item of 
evidence is governed by a set of rules. For 
example, the probative value of a witness’s 
testimony depends on his or her position 
in society — whether a professional or 
merely a worker. These evidentiary rules, 
like the substantive law of the civil code, 
are therefore more authoritatively under-
stood by higher level judges. 
In common-law systems the appellate 
court reviews for “error” in jury-tried cases 
and “abuse of discretion” in most judge-
tried cases. The deference to jury findings 
derives from the constitutional basis of 
the jury trial itself. The deference to trial 
court findings in judge-tried cases reflects 
recognition that the trial judge has had 
opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. 
It would appear that the civil-law system 
makes appeals relatively attractive; I have 
heard some lawyers in civil systems say 
that the proceeding in the first-instance 
court is actually a preliminary hearing. 
Moreover, common-law systems include 
the concept of “harmless error,” so that 
establishing that the trial court commit-
ted a mistake does not necessarily make 
for a successful appeal.
In light of these complications, the 
comment to Rule 33 states that in general 
“appellate review should be through the 
procedures available in the court system of 
the forum.” 
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Some differences between civil-law and 
common-law systems are of low visibility. 
In the matter of notice, for example, it was 
interesting to learn that in Germany and 
perhaps some other European countries, 
notice to defendants is ordinarily given 
electronically, whereas in our systems the 
old-fashioned manual service of summons 
is the default rule and is still used in most 
cases. The Transnational Rules recognize 
that there are differences in notice proce-
dure and adopt the forum’s procedure 
subject to specified requirements. Rule 
7.1 provides:
A party must be given formal notice in 
accordance with forum law by means 
reasonably likely to be effective. 
Rule 7.2 goes on to require that notice 
be in the target’s language and include 
the statement of claim and specify the 
time to respond.
A more visible difference is that in 
many civil-law systems, and in English 
high courts, the advocates wear black robes, 
signifying a judicious role similar to the 
judicial role. The Transnational Rules leave 
that subject alone.
JOINDER, PLEADING, RES 
JUDICATA
Three other low-visibility differences are 
interrelated: the joinder of claims in a civil 
action; the pleading of multiple theories of 
liability; and the scope of res judicata upon 
conclusion of a civil action. Understanding 
these issues requires reference to the under-
lying substantive law in contemporary 
civil-law systems. 
The substantive law in civil-law 
systems historically is expressed in 
comprehensive civil codes, patterned on 
the Napoleonic Code that was adopted in 
France at the turn of the 19th Century. 
The civil-law theory is that law is exclu-
sively expressed in the codes, and that 
other legal sources, including judicial 
opinions, are on a lesser footing. 
UNITARY OR DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
This civil-law premise is based on the 
unitary sovereignty that is established in 
the national state in which a civil code has 
been adopted. From different historical 
origins, the United Kingdom of England 
and Wales (thus not including Scotland) 
also has a unitary sovereignty. 
In contrast, the American federal 
system involves dual sovereignty: A 
supreme but subject-matter limited 
national authority, founded in the 
Constitution, and a residual plenary 
authority in the states, formally recog-
nized in the Tenth Amendment. Among 
other things, the U.S. dual-sovereignty 
system has resulted in a major law-mak-
ing role for the judiciary, centered in the 
Supreme Court. It is generally the courts 
that authoritatively determine the bound-
aries between national and state authority. 
Because the boundaries have changed 
over time and have always been gray areas 
rather than strict lines, American law on 
the subject has always been complicated. 
In a dual-sovereignty system, advocates 
on both sides in a civil case must consider 
whether both federal and state substantive 
law may afford at least arguable rights and 
defenses. For example, a claim of invasion 
of privacy may be available under the U.S. 
Constitution and under a state consti-
tution or statute. So also law regulating 
the environment may emanate from both 
federal and state statutes. Attention  may 
also be required to differences in proce-
dure in federal and state courts where 
those courts have concurrent jurisdiction. 
American lawyers and judges therefore 
have long functioned in a very compli-
cated legal system.
What has been emerging in Europe 
over recent decades is a similar if narrower 
dual sovereignty. This is a product of a 
trans-European body of higher “constitu-
tional” law, propounded by the courts in 
interpreting basic European treaties. As 
this body of law has gradually accumu-
lated, it creates increasing possibilities 
that a given event or transaction in a 
European system can be subject to both 
the traditional civil code or common 
law (in England) and the limited but 
supreme reach of trans-European law.  
These possibilities invite claimants to 
propound multiple claims based on multi-
ple substantive theories; defendants have 
similar leeway in affirmative defenses. 
These possibilities require recognition 
of a right to plead alternative theories 
and to join multiple claims, and may 
also affect joinder of parties. Accordingly, 
Transnational Rule 12.4 provides that “a 
party who is justifiably uncertain of a fact 
or legal grounds may make statements 
about them in the alternative.”
There is a correlative res judicata 
question: What is the effect of a judgment 
in which only the unitary sovereignty 
claim, civil code or common law, had been 
asserted? Does a trans-European legal claim 
survive? Or should a counterpart of the 
U.S. rule of claim preclusion apply? Many 
European jurists and lawyers have been 
puzzled by these possibilities, given their 
professional acculturation in systems of 
unitary national sovereignty. The subject of 
res judicata is outside the scope of typical 
procedural codes. At any rate, the U.S. rule 
is that if the two claims arose out of the 
same event or transaction, then gener-
ally both must be asserted in the original 
action, on pain of preclusion in subsequent 
litigation. See Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 24. 
JURY, DISCOVERY AND ROLES OF 
LAWYER AND JUDGES
The differences between European and 
American systems are more evident in the 
procedure for determining facts; in “access 
to evidence” a.k.a “discovery”; and in the 
roles of lawyers and judges. These differ-
ences are correlated with each other. 
Jury Trial
The basic American procedure for determin-
ing facts is of course jury trial. Jury trial is 
a right largely determined by constitutional 
provisions — the Seventh Amendment in 
the federal system and similar provisions 
in state constitutions. Moreover, the right 
to jury trial has wide popular support, such 
that it is virtually impossible for it to be 
repealed. In contrast, civil-law systems have 
never had general use of juries. As noted 
earlier, England, although historically a 
common-law jurisdiction, has long since 
discarded the jury role in all but narrow 
categories of civil litigation. 
The practical importance of jury trial is 
not that there are so many jury trials — the 
“vanishing jury” is much talked about. In 
most American jurisdictions jury trials are 
actually held in less than five percent of 
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civil cases filed. Accordingly, it should be 
recognized that in American civil litigation 
the significance of jury trial is rather the 
prospect of jury trial that hovers over most 
civil cases. The possibility of jury trial is 
especially menacing to corporate defen-
dants whose conduct could be considered as 
overreach according to popular concepts of 
right and wrong. 
Broad Discovery
The broad discovery afforded in FRCP 
26–37, and its state law counterparts, is 
justified in important part as a means of 
assembling evidence before trial for even-
tual presentation to a jury. Any particular 
jury is assembled ad hoc, sits through a 
single continuous trial session, and then is 
dissolved. It is therefore generally imprac-
tical to have a jury function in sequential 
sessions. Accordingly, all evidence for trial 
must be assembled before trial. Before 
modern pretrial discovery exemplified in 
the FRCP, the adversaries typically had 
to guess what the opposing party’s proof 
would be. Under modern discovery, that 
proof can be fully exposed before trial.
Roles of Judges and Lawyers
Theoretically, assembly of the evidence 
could be assigned to judges. However, this 
would be inconsistent with the fundamen-
tal proposition that a litigant is entitled 
to assistance of a lawyer. Proper legal 
assistance in the common-law tradition 
includes fashioning legal claims and 
pursuing evidence relevant to those claims. 
Discovery obtained by the advocates serves 
these purposes. 
Expert Testimony
Expert testimony is helpful and often 
essential in much modern litigation. An 
important issue is selection of the experts. 
In most common-law jurisdictions, and 
in the U.S., each party may select its 
experts, taking into account their stature 
in the field, their effectiveness as a witness, 
and their availability. In most civil-law 
systems, engaging experts is in the court’s 
discretion and the selection is up to the 
judge. Typically, when expert testimony is 
regarded as necessary, the judge will confer 
with a convenient university or specialized 
source to identify a suitable expert.
The advocate’s role also includes a 
discerning assessment of the quality of the 
evidence. This too is furthered by pretrial 
discovery. For example, an important 
question is whether, in the estimate of the 
advocates for the parties, a key witness is 
reasonably articulate and can hold up under 
cross examination at trial. Discovery depo-
sitions afford a preview of that issue. In the 
present era of electronic communication, 
a decisive issue can be whether key email 
documents — damaging or protective — 
are available. Pretrial discovery can resolve 
that issue.
Discovery depositions and documents 
discovery ordinarily are almost entirely 
the responsibility of the lawyers. FRCP 
16 confers broad authority on the judge 
to provide case management. In practice, 
however, most of the scheduling and 
calendaring is done by agreements of 
the lawyers that are ratified in orders by 
the judges. Indeed, the broad discovery 
enabled by FRCP 26–37 is possible only 
because it is conducted primarily by the 
advocates. Under typical judicial staffing 
in the American system, caseloads are such 
that the judges do not have time, or incli-
nation, to pursue extended case manage-
ment. There has been growing pressure 
for greater judicial involvement, but in 
practice substantial judicial involvement 
typically will focus on complex cases.
In any event, broad pretrial discov-
ery of course is not an unmixed blessing. 
Wide-ranging advocate-driven discovery 
is notoriously considered a curse by many 
in the legal fraternity. Efforts continue 
to devise practical limitations, such as 
conferring broad powers on the judge to 
limit discovery, as in FRCP 26(b)(2), and 
imposing tight limits on the number and 
duration of depositions, as in many state 
civil procedure rules. The discovery system 
also generates the need for advocates who 
can maintain a balance between being civil 
and being zealous. 
Broad discovery is regarded with horror 
by most European lawyers, judges, and 
government officials. Their conception of 
U.S. discovery is anecdotal, responsive to 
aggressive efforts by American lawyers to 
obtain evidence from European sources. At 
the same time, sober assessments of access to 
justice recognize that there is often unequal 
access to evidence, particularly in litigation 
between individuals and organizations.  
A type of “discovery” is the rule govern-
ing pleading. American lawyers are well 
aware of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009). These decisions tightened the 
requirements of FRCP 8, if in uncertain 
degree, but they clearly require specificity 
in key factual allegations. 
The pleading requirements in the 
Transnational Rules entail substantially 
greater “discovery.” Rule 12.1 provides:
The plaintiff must state the facts on which 
the claim is based, [and] describe the 
evidence to support those statements . . . 
Rule 12.3 provides:
The statement of facts must, so far as 
reasonably practicable, set forth detail as 
to time, place, participants, and events. 
Rule 13.4 imposes the same require-
ments on defendants in an answer, affirma-
tive defense, and counterclaim.
The Transnational Rules make carefully 
guarded provisions for further disclosure 
of evidence, with emphasis on the role of 
the judge.  
Rules 21–21.1.2 require that a party 
“identify to the court and other parties 
the evidence on which the party intends 
to rely, including . . . copies of documents 
. . . [and] summaries of expected testimony 
of witnesses, including experts.” Rule 
21.2 requires updating the disclosures if 
additional items are to be used. Rule 21.3 
addresses a matter that is very sensitive in 
most European systems: “A lawyer for a 
party may have a voluntary interview with 
a potential nonparty witness. The inter-
view may be on reasonable notice to other 
parties, who may be permitted to attend 
the interview.”
Rule 22.1 gives the court broad author-
ity to order additional disclosure: 
A party may request the court to 
order production by any person of any 
evidentiary matter, not protected by 
confidentiality or privilege, that is 
relevant to the case and that may be 
admissible, including . . . documents 
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. . .  persons having knowledge of a 
matter in issue . . . [and] the report of 
any expert that another party intends 
to present.” 
The foregoing authority would empower 
a court to order pretrial disclosure virtually 
as broad as the U.S. rules in FRCP 26–37. 
Given the European tradition, however, it 
is quite unlikely that any such order would 
be issued or, if issued, sustained on appeal.
Pretrial Motions
All legal systems provide for activities 
prior to final hearing. In civil-law systems, 
cases usually proceed in a sequence of 
short hearings. These hearings can address 
preliminary objections, such as a challenge 
to jurisdiction, or issues on the merits, or 
consideration of evidence. In common-
law systems similar sessions are called 
pretrial hearings, and the matters typically 
are addressed through motions. Pretrial 
motions can address procedural matters, 
such as scheduling of depositions, and 
substantive matters. 
The classic substantive motion is the 
motion to dismiss, originally called the 
general demurrer in common-law systems. 
A motion to dismiss addresses the text of 
the complaint (or an affirmative defense), 
and contends that, even if the allegations 
are eventually proved through evidence, 
they do not constitute a valid basis for 
a claim. But the demurrer or motion to 
dismiss does not address potential evidence. 
Accordingly, in classic common law, any 
examination of evidence had to await trial.
 Under modern procedure the court 
has comprehensive authority to deal with 
matters prior to plenary trial. American 
lawyers are familiar with FRCP 16, 
governing pretrial procedure, and Rule 
26 governing discovery in particular. 
Transnational Rules 18–18.7, entitled 
“Case Management,” require the court to 
“assume active management of the proceed-
ing in all stages of the litigation.” To do so, 
a judge may:
• set “a planning conference early in the 
proceeding” (Rule 18.2)
• “suggest amendment of the pleadings” 
(Rule 18.3.1) 
• “order [a] separate hearing of one or 
more issues” (Rule 18.3.2)
• “make decisions concerning admissi-
bility and exclusion of evidence” (Rule 
18.3.4)
• “order any person subject to the court’s 
authority to produce documents or 
other evidence” (Rule 18.3.5)           
Summary Judgment
In combination the foregoing powers 
authorize what is known in common-law 
procedure as the motion for summary judg-
ment. That motion is key in common-law 
systems, particularly in the U.S. with its 
right of jury trial.
The motion for summary judgment 
was invented in late 19th-century English 
procedure. It allowed a motion to dismiss 
not only to address an opposed pleading 
but also to be supported by evidence, 
particularly relevant documents and affida-
vits by witnesses. Originally the summary 
judgment motion could be brought only 
in suits to collect on promissory notes. 
Over the years the motion was adopted 
in the U.S. and its scope enlarged. In the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted 
in 1938 the motion was made available in 
any kind of case. It is now officially called 
a motion for judgment as a matter of law, 
but in practice it is still called the motion 
for summary judgment. It has become the 
most important pretrial motion and the 
most important event in civil litigation 
except trial itself.
The prospect of jury trial is the driving 
force in motions for, and in resistance to, 
summary judgment. The essential issue 
posed by the motion is whether there is 
enough admissible evidence to send the 
case to a jury. If there is not such evidence 
in the judge’s estimate, then according 
to FRCP 56 there should be a “judgment 
according to law” for the moving party. The 
procedure builds on the long-established rule 
concerning a motion for a directed verdict. 
That motion, made a trial, authorizes the 
judge to preempt a jury verdict if the judge 
determines that the evidence is insufficient 
to permit the jury to make a reasonable deci-
sion against the party making the motion. 
The motion for summary judgment 
advances the issue of sufficiency of evidence 
to the pretrial stage. Many lawyers and law 
teachers consider that the combination of 
FRCP 26–37 (discovery) and 56 (summary 
judgment) is what most modern contested 
cases are about. To be sure, not all of the 95 
percent or so of civil cases resolved without 
trial are determined by summary judgment. 
Indeed probably less than half of those cases 
have involved a summary judgment motion; 
the available statistics are not refined enough 
to say. Nevertheless, a judge’s decision on a 
summary judgment motion can grant it in 
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part, overrule it with skeptical comment, 
or otherwise express an opinion about the 
evidence. The lawyers will pay close atten-
tion and adjust their assessment of settle-
ment possibilities.
The procedure involved in summary 
judgment is functionally similar to the 
procedure in a civil-law sequence of court 
determinations: First, statements of claim 
in the pleadings; second, assembly of 
evidence, through discovery (common law) 
or directions of the court (civil law); third, 
decision short of final plenary hearing.
THE TRANSNATIONAL RULES 
The key provisions in the Transnational 
Principles and Rules of Civil Procedure are: 
• Notice to a defendant should be 
according to the regular procedure of 
the first-instance court, but if defen-
dant resides elsewhere then additional 
notice would be appropriate.
• Interlocutory procedures for secur-
ing an eventual judgment, such as 
attachment, should be according to the 
forum’s rules.
• The first-instance court should be 
active in managing the litigation.
• Joinder of claims and parties should 
be liberally allowed. Attention should 
be paid to the correlative rule of res 
judicata.
• The parties should append to their 
pleadings copies of documents and 
sworn declarations of witnesses they 
expect to rely on. 
• Limited discovery should be afforded, 
broader than typical European systems 
but more limited than in the U.S.
• The parties should be allowed to pres-
ent expert witnesses that they engage, 
rather than being limited to experts 
appointed by the court.
• The finder of fact should give a written 
explanation of its determination. 
• Appellate review should be conducted 
according to the forum’s regular appel-
late procedure.
The European Law Institute is proceed-
ing in light of these proposals. Its work has 
only begun and will culminate in its own 
determinations. However, it is a reason-
able forecast that the final product will be 
substantially similar to the Transnational 
Principles and Rules.  
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